CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

26 April 1982

Mr. Brian V. Kinney
Chief, Declassification and
Historical Research Branch
Records Management Division
Washington Headquarters Services
Room 1D517, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Dear Mr. Kinney:

We have reviewed the documents forwarded to us under a memorandum dated 30 March 1982 from Mr. E. E. Lowry, Jr., OSD, Records Administrator. The results of our classification review of the documents under Paragraph 3-401 of Executive Order 12065 are as follows:

- a. We have downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL the paper dated 27 August 1953, Subject: French Action in Morocco Creates New Problems. Classification is retained under exemption 1-301(d) of E.O. 12065. The next review date is 1992.
- b. We have no objection to declassification of the paper dated 3 November 1955, Subject: Item 5 (For Discussion) -- Situation in Brazil Following the Elections.
- c. We have declassified the paper dated 22 March 1954, Subject: Major U.S. Interests in Africa.

Sincerely,

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Chief, Classification Review Division
Office of Information Services
Directorate of Administration

NSC review completed - unredacted segments may be declassified

Enclosures:

- 1. Paper dtd 27 Aug 53
- 2. Paper dtd 3 Nov 55
- 3. Paper dtd 22 Mar 54

OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

Unclassified when Separated from Enclosures

Distribution:

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CIA No. 50313 moracco)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE 27 August 1953

FRENCH ACTION IN MOROCCO CREATES NEW PROBLEMS

The French government's exchange of sultans in Morocco will enable French authorities to revamp the protectorate's administration along the lines that they desire; however, the basic conflict between Moroccan desires for home rule and the French wish to maintain absolute control remains unresolved. American unpopularity in the area will increase, and the US treaty rights and airbases are endangered.

On 20 August the French cabinet finally yielded to pressure from the Residency General and French vested interests in Morocco and approved the removal of Sidi Mohamed ben Youssef as sultan of Morocco, replacing him with a cousin, Moulay Mohamed ben Arafa. The latter, who had been declared the religious ruler of Morocco by tribal chieftain El Glaoui six days earlier, precipitating the latest crisis, was duly confirmed as sultan by religious elders on 21 August.

between the former sultan and French authorities, will be approved by the new sultan, whom the French feel sure they can control. These measures superficially modernize the local government by imposing a front of quasi-democratic institutions. Theoretically they provide for a separation of executive, legislative, and judicial power; but actually they legalize direct Fench administration in the protectorate.

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
France's gains through ousting the sultan are far outweighed by its prospective losses. Replacement of the able and moderate Ben Youssef by an aged, reactionary figurehead will win some temporary political support from feudal tribesmen and seekers of political plums. On the other hand, this gain will be more than offset by the alienation of the growing middle class, which includes the bulk of the Western-educated and politically conscious Arabs and Berbers.

The anti-sultan movement was spearheaded by El Glaoui, the pasha of Marrakech. The movement was built up by Residency officials and condoned by Resident General Guillaume in contravention of the French Foreign Ministry's instructions. El Glaoui has won a personal victory to the embarrassment of Paris, but his pliability cannot be considered permanent. His demands will probably be excessive and his activities cause the French more trouble. The French may therefore have to resort again to divide-and-rule tactics in order to curb El Glaoui.

Dethronement of the popular sultan will increase the animosity toward the French, already widespread among both Berber and Arab subjects. It will further embitter the approximately two million Arabs and Berbers who sympathize with the nationalist Istiqlal party, which has about 100,000 hard-core members. It will increase the likelihood of their becoming prey to anti-American propaganda spread by the Communists, who number about 5,000 with a hard core of several hundred and a European directorate.

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The Istiqlal party may now abandon moderation and resort to underground terrorism. Although it is not known to have any military equipment and could not now stage a full-scale rebellion, it will try to obtain foreign support, secure weapons, and subvert native troops. Despite extensive security measures, isolated incidents of violence are taking place.

Prolonged political agitation would force the French to retain their large military establishment in Morocco. It now consists of more than 66,000 army, navy, air and quasi-military forces.

powers, particularly the United Kingdom and the Netherlands; but Spain, which holds a protectorate over northern Morocco, is not likely to give more than tacit approval so long as it continues its policy of rapprochement with the Arab states. There has been immediate denunciation of France by the Arab-Asian bloc. It has demanded Security Council action and will probably be supported in this maneuver by the anticolonial nations. Bitter debate within the United Nations General Assembly probably will follow. The Soviet Union, anxious to see a rift in the Western alliance, will benefit from any controversy which develops.

The removal of the sultan worsens the position of the United States in Morocco. American popularity among the natives in general and the nationalists in particular will diminish because they hoped for support for their aspirations.

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
French settlers and vested interests in Morocco are highly suspicious of American intentions. This attitude will be sharpened following the expression on 21 August of official US concern. Moreover, the Residency General will probably repeat previous charges that American officials have assisted the nationalists.

The four operational American air force and naval air bases in Morocco will be targets for sabotage if the Communists or the nationalists resort to terrorism. Local French pressures on Paris may also prolong the delays in building the other two bases provided for in a French-American agreement of December 1950.

The new French-dominated sultan may be asked to denounce the US-Moroccan treaty of 1836, the basis of American treaty rights in Morocco. France has long sought to annul the extraterritorial privileges which only the US continues to hold and which were upheld by the World Court in August 1952. Abrogation of this treaty would end the commercial open door in Morocco which has existed since the signing of the Treaty of Algerians in 1906.

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ITEM 5 (For Discussion)

SITUATION IN BRAZIL FOLLOWING THE KLECTIONS

- 1. At the Council meeting of 20 October, a discussion of the recent Brazilian elections arose in connection with Allen Dulles' intelligence briefing, and the Council requested that a special presentation on this subject be prepared by State and CIA for a subsequent meeting. This report is responsive to that request.
- 2. Although the election returns indicate that Kubitschek and Goulart have won the presidency and vice presidency, respectively, the unexpected vote polled by General Tavora indicates that moderate-conservative forces are large and, if properly organized and led, would be sufficiently solid to counterbalance or out-number the left wing. Had votes for Tavora not been siphoned off by another conservative candidate, it is probable that Tavora would have won. The relatively narrow margin which the winners held over their opponents indicates that Communist support was the deciding factor.
- 3. A question still remains as to acceptance by the military of the election results. The basis for opposition to Kubitschek lies principally in his alliance with Coulart, whose pro-Communist proclivities could facilitate the growth of Communist influence. The seeds of a coup to overthrow Kubitschek are present. That such a move has not taken place by this time is probably due to the opposition of leading elements of the army and of nearly all political groups to any extralegal move. This factor, together with a shake-up in the armed forces hierarchy on 18 October removing certain army leaders favoring a coup, serves to diminish, but not eliminate, the threat of a military coup before the new regime takes office on 31 January 1956.
- 4. Kubitschek has publicly stated his intention to cooperate with the U.S. to the fullest extent. However, his record as Governor of Mines Gerais indicates that he is a strong advocate of some of the anti-foreign policies of Vargas. If installed as president, Kubitschak will probably initially scorn any assistance from Goulart and the Communist Party, in an attempt firmly to establish his regime and thereby forestall a military uprising. Further, it is believed that he will initially soft-pedal any anti-foreign tendencies because of the adverse effect such action would have on Brazil's already critical economic situation. It is estimated that Kubitschek will probably fail to secure the respect and cooperation of the military, the Congress, and powerful economic pressure groups necessary to establish an effective regime. To help bolster his position, he is anxious to visit the U.S. before taking office.

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22 March 1954

MAJOR U.S. INTERESTS IN AFRICA

* indicates those of greatest importance

A. Strategica

- *1. Resources Uranium, manganese, chrome, asbestos, corundum, diamonds, palm products, sisal, tin, rubber, cobalt, copper.
- #2. Hilitary Air and naval bases, manpower, ship repair and supply, staging areas.

B. Economic:

- Mineral and agricultural production cocoa, iron ore, spices, phosphates.
- Support of European economies— dollar earners such as cocoa, products supplied within own currency area.
- 3. In the distant future- expanded market for US investment capital and exports; now limited due to colonial policies, difficulties in repatriation of earnings, small market.

C. Political:

- *1. Keeping Africa stable and on the free world side for its strength and so that it does not impair European strength.
- *2. Minimizing differences over colonial policies which affect U.N. actions, and tend to separate US from Western European allies.
 - 3. Meeting potential communist threat.
 - 4. Gradual solution to racialism, which handicaps free world unity especially with color conscious East and Latin America

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, HEADQUARTERS SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

March 30, 1982

NSC review completed - may be declassified in full

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, CLASSIFICATION REVIEW DIVISION, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: Request for Declassification Review

During the systematic review of all classified Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) documents over 20 years old, the Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Directorate for Correspondence and Directives, Washington Headquarters Services, turned up the attached document(s).

The documents were either originated by your agency, contain information for which your agency is the classification authority, or are otherwise of interest to you.

It is therefore requested that your agency review the documents and recommend declassification, continued classification at the present or lesser level of classification, and/or review by other agencies. If your agency is recommending continued classification, in accordance with Paragraph 3-401, Executive Order 12065, it is requested that an authority for continued classification be specified, along with a date for the next review.

The time permitted by Executive Order 12065 to reach the point where all OSD documents over 20 years old have been reviewed, and the large volume of over 20 year old OSD documents, make it necessary to request your response within 60 days. In your response, you may wish to provide guidance with regard to what categories of information you do and do not wish to have referred to you in the future.

Your assistance in effecting this review will be most appreciated. Please return the documents to Mr. Brian V. Kinney, Chief, Declassification and Historical Research Branch, Records Management Division, Washington Head-quarters Services, Room 1D517, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. 20301, upon completion of your review.

Without attachments, this memorandum is UNCLASSIFIED.

E. E. Lowry, J

OSD Records Administrator

Attachments (3)

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OSD-DB-TS-063-82

LIST OF ATTACHMENTS

- Paper, 27 Aug 53, Subj: French Action in Morocco Creates New Problems, CIA No. 50313 (TS)
- 2. Paper, 3 Nov 55, Subj: Item 5 (For Discussion) Situation in Brazil Following the Elections (S)
- 3. Paper, 22 Mar 54, Subj: Major U.S. Interests in Africa (C)